| Author(s): | UNODC, World Bank Group |
| Year: | 2024 |
| Involved Countries/Regions: | Global |
| Type of Resource: | Publication by UNODC and partners |
| Categories: |
Specific areas
Corruption and climate change
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The revised discussion draft provides a brief overview of cross-cutting corruption risks in the response to climate change and focuses on corruption risks associated with three key challenge areas: growing demand for energy; management of climate funds; uncertainty of carbon markets.
Investing in climate change mitigation, adaptation and resilience is going to require trillions in financing, as well as new regulations, new financing instruments, and new markets. The potential for corruption to undermine the effectiveness of the global response to climate change, distort decision making, and increase costs means that tackling corruption must be at the heart of the climate response. These risks are present in the global north and the global south. Where there are large money flows, as seen in renewable energy projects, climate mitigation funds or responses to climate emergencies, the risk for corruption is heightened and may already be a concern. Corruption also poses a critical barrier to effective climate action since vested interests can distort or undermine the design and implementation of key policies or enable the embezzlement or misallocation of climate funds. In these contexts, and in countries where the capacity of oversight and accountability institutions to control corruption is low, attention to corruption risks needs to be an integral part of the design of climate response policies and financing solutions.
Failing to address corruption in the response to climate change will hinder the effective implementation and achievement of international, regional, and national instruments and commitments, among them, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and National Determined Contributions (NDCs). Further, corruption in climate funding erodes trust in governments and public trust in climate change policymaking. It also hinders private investments and can be used as an argument by high CO2 emitters to avoid flows of money to some of the more impacted countries, further exacerbating inequalities in the impacts of climate change on low-income countries. Closing the financing gap, and ensuring that climate financing achieves intended objectives require action on corruption.
The purpose of this note is to inform discussion among anticorruption and climate change policymakers and practitioners on the links between corruption and the response to climate change, and to direct attention to these links in a policymaking environment where multiple financing and environmental challenges are already vying for attention. It sets outs some of the cross-cutting corruption risks and vulnerabilities in the response to climate change, focuses on a few core challenge areas, and identifies areas for further research. This note has benefited from discussion with and suggestions from numerous experts. An earlier version of this discussion draft was shared at the 10th Session of the Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (COSP10) in December 2023. This revised discussion draft provides (i) a brief overview of cross cutting corruption risks in the response to climate change, and then focuses on corruption risks associated with three key challenge areas: (ii) with the growing demand for energy; (iii) with the management of climate funds; (iv) and with the uncertainty of carbon markets. For each challenge area, specific vulnerabilities, corruption risks, illustrative examples, and opportunities for action are outlined. A final section suggests areas for further research.
